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1 Introduction
Firms have fragmented their production activity dramatically in recent years.
However, depending on industrial type, there exist significant differences in
the location pattern of production activity. For example, the location pattern
of consumer electronics production is quite different from that of automobile
industry.
Hard disc drive industry, for example, separated the location of assembly
process globally. Gourevitch, Bohn and Mckendrick (2000) have explored
the following story in detail. In 1980, over 80% of the world’s hard disks
were assembled in the United States. While 15 years later over 80% of the
world’s hard disks were made by US firms, but less than 5% of drives were
assembled in the United States. Most disk drives are assembled in-house
through overseas production networks. Southeast Asia, especially Singapore,
occupies the 64% of world final assembly in 1997. Subassembly with low
skilled and labor intensive activity is done mainly in China. Whereas, R&D
is located mainly in Silicon Valley where the close collaborative process of
firms yields strong knowledge externalities (Saxenian 1996). Furthermore,
such consumer electronics sector developed many global standards.
On the other hand, large automobile companies have established manu-
facturing plants recently in nearly all of major regional markets around the
world because of high trade costs due to government regulations and cul-
tural differences. New plants are also located in the emerging markets such
as Thailand and Indonesia. Rugman and Hodgets (2001) suggests that re-
gional production and large local sales occur in North America, Europe and
Japan.
Such a fragmentation of production activity has been caused by several
major factors. One is the large wage-differentials among countries. In connec-
tion with the example of hard disc drive industry above, the hourly wage rate
for people involved in assembly in 1995 is as follows: China, $.25; Singapore,
$7.28; and United States, $17.20 (Gourevitch, Bohn and Mckendrick 1997).
Another motivation to separate productions arises from the recent develop-
ment of information technology (IT). In general, the information transfer
between headquarters and plants involves more costs when HQs communi-
cate with remote plants, where HQs provide their plants with various ser-
vices such as management, R&D, marketing and finance. For example, Kim
(1999) mentioned about U.S. manufacturing that “the cost of coordinating
the activities of plants located in different regions was higher than the cost
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of managing a similarly sized firm with only one plant”. However, the rapid
progress in communication technology has been decreasing communication
costs greatly. Bernstein (2000) shows, for example, that the use of modern
communication equipments reduces significantly the variable costs for Cana-
dian manufacturing industry, which is highly integrated with the U.S. econ-
omy. The third major cause is, of course, the significant decrease in trade
costs of products, which reflects the progress in transportation technology
(based on IT).
The objective of this paper is to provide an analytical framework within
which we can assess the impact of the decrease in communication costs be-
tween HQs and plants and in transportation costs of products on the spatial
organization of multi-unit firms. The recent literature on economic geogra-
phy mostly assumes that firms are integrated, with each firm conducting its
entire operation at a single location (Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999).
Fujita and Thisse (2002) is an exception, considering a general equilibrium
model in which each firm has the headquarters and a plant. In this paper, we
extend Fujita and Thisse (2002) by introducing multi-plant firms. Indeed,
many multinational firms have a large number of plants in different countries.
The setting of our model is as follows. The economic space consists of
two regions, A and B. The economy has two production sectors, the modern
sector (M) and the traditional sector (T). There are two production factors,
the high-skilled workers and the low-skilled workers. The economy is endowed
with given populations of unskilled and of skilled workers. The skilled workers
are perfectly mobile between regions whereas the unskilled are immobile.
TheM-sector produces a continuum of varieties of horizontally differentiated
products under increasing returns, using both skilled and unskilled workers.
The T-sector produces a homogeneous good under constant returns, using
unskilled labor as the only input. The productivity of unskilled workers in the
T-sector is assumed to be higher in region A than in region B. Each variety of
M-good is produced by a separate firm. Each firm has the headquarter and
one or two plants. When a plant is not located with HQ, communication
cost are involved. The second plant requires an additional fixed cost. To
send the differentiated products to the other region, transportation cost is
required. We endogenise the entry decision of firms. Each firm can choose
whether to have a plant in either region or a plant in each region. We focus
on equilibria in which all headquarters are agglomerated in region A (the
core region), while plants may be dispersed. Using our model, we investigate
how different levels of transportation costs, communication costs, and the
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fixed costs for the second plant may generate different spatial patterns of
production.
Following the presentation of the model in Section 2, we determine in Sec-
tion 3 the conditions for the location pattern of plants and the agglomeration
of all headquarters in the core. Section 4 examines the impact of decreasing
trade costs and communication costs on the location pattern of plants. We
show that each firm has a single plant that locates together with the HQ,
when 1) the fixed costs to build an additional plant are large, 2) the trade
costs of manufactured goods are small, and 3) communication costs are high.
By contrast, each firm has a single plant which locates in the separate region
from the HQ, when 1)the fixed costs to build an additional plant are large,
2)the trade costs of manufactured goods are small, and 3)the communication
costs are low. Whereas multi-plant firms emerge when 1)the fixed costs to
build an additional plant are small, 2)the trade costs of manufactured goods
are large and 3)the communication costs are medium. 1 In Section 5, we con-
duct the welfare analysis, examining the impact of decreasing communication
costs on the welfare of skilled and unskilled workers. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 The model
Based on the general setting introduced in the preceeding section, we spec-
ify our model as follows. Preferences are identical across all workers and
expressed by a Cobb-Douglas utility:
U = QµΥ1−µ/µµ(1− µ)1−µ 0 < µ < 1 (1)
where Q is an index of the consumption of M varieties, while Υ stands for
the consumption of the output of the traditional sector. When the modern
sector provides a continuum of differentiated varieties of size m, the index Q
is given by
Q =
[∫ m
0
q(i)ρdi
]1/ρ
0 < ρ < 1 (2)
where q(i) represents the consumption of variety i ∈ [0,m]. In (2), the
parameter ρ represents the inverse of the intensity of love for variety over the
1These result are consistent with these in Markusen and Venables(2000). However,
they consider only transport costs for products while focusing on how the difference in the
endowments of labor and capital may generate spatial patterns of production.
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differentiated products. When ρ is close to 1, differentiated goods are close to
perfect substitutes; when ρ decreases, the desire to consume a greater variety
of manufactured goods increases. If we set
σ ≡ 1
1− ρ 1 < σ
then σ is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. Because
there is a continuum of firms, each firm is negligible and the direct interac-
tions between any two firms are zero, but the aggregate market conditions
affect each firm.
If Y is the consumer income, pT the price of the traditional good and p(i)
the price of variety i, then the demand functions are
Υ = (1− µ)Y/pT (3)
q(i) =
µY
p(i)
p(i)−(σ−1)
P−(σ−1)
i ∈ [0,m] (4)
where P is the price index of differentiated products, given by
P ≡
[∫ m
0
p(i)−(σ−1)di
]−1/(σ−1)
(5)
Substituting (3) and (4) into (1) yields the indirect utility function
v = Y P−µ(pT)−(1−µ)
Technologies in each of the two sectors differ from what is usually assumed
in economic geography models. The technology in the T-sector is such that
one unit of output requires ar ≥ 1 units of unskilled labor in region r = A,B.
Without loss of generality, assuming that the ratio of land to population is
large in region A and small in region B, we set aA = 1 and aB ≥ 1, thus
allowing unskilled workers in the traditional sector to be more productive
in region A than in region B. Let LA and LB be the number (mass) of
unskilled workers in region A and B, respectively. In order to retain the
standard assumption of symmetry between the two regions, we assume that
the spatial distribution of unskilled workers is such that both regions have
the same amount of effective units of unskilled labor:
LA =
LB
aB
=
L
2
(6)
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The output of the T-sector is costlessly traded between any two regions and
is chosen as the nume´raire so that pT = 1. We further assume that the
expenditure share (1 − µ) on the T-good is sufficiently large for the T-good
to be always produced in both regions. In this case, the equilibrium wages
for the unskilled are such that
wLA = 1 w
L
B = 1/aB ≤ 1 (7)
Hence, a factor-price motive may explain the multinationalization of firms.
However, as will be seen below, factor price differential is not the only reason
for vertical fragmentation.
The technology of the M-sector is more complex. The setting of a head-
quarter requires a fixed amount f of skilled workers when the firm has a single
plant. Whereas, when the firm has two plants, the setting of a headquar-
ter(HQ) needs a fixed amount (1 + α)f of skilled workers, where 0 < α < 1.
If wHr denotes the skilled workers’ wage in region r, then, using (6) and (7),
the total income of region r is
Yr = Srw
H
r + L/2 r = A,B (8)
where Sr is the number of skilled worker in region r. When the HQ is located
in region r and the plant in region s, producing q(i) units of variety i requires
l(i) units of unskilled labor;
l(i) = crsq(i)
where crs > 0 is the plant’s marginal labor requirement. The value of crs
decreases with the effectiveness of the services provided by the HQ to its
plant, which depends itself on the following two factors. First, the accumu-
lation of human capital and face-to-face communications within the same
region generates Marshallian externalities which make the HQ of firm i more
effective in its supply of services to its plant. This implies that crs decreases
with the number Sr ≥ 0 of skilled workers living in region r. Second, the
distance between the HQ and its plant affects negatively the effectiveness of
the HQ-services. This is because (i) it is easier to monitor the effort of the
plant manager when the plant is located near the HQ than across borders
(Grossman and Helpman 2004) and (ii) the transmission of information at a
distance is often imperfect (Leamer and Storper 2001). More precisely, when
both the HQ and its plant are located in the same region (r = s) we have
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crs = c(Sr), whereas crs = c(Sr)TH holds when they are located in different
regions (r 6= s). Here, TH > 1 expresses all the difficulty to communicate
within the firm when the HQ and a plant are physically separated, which is
represented by the iceberg transfer technology of HQ-services to the plant.
When the information is not easily transferred, TH may become large.
When the plant is set up with its HQ in region r, the plant production
function is thus given by
l(i) = c(Sr)q(i) r = s
By contrast, when the plant is located in a different region, we have:
l(i) = c(Sr)THq(i) r 6= s
This specification has two implications. First, when the plant is not located
with its HQ, it is less efficient and therefore needs a larger amount of local
input. That is, we recognize that the physical separation of HQs and plants
generates a cost for firms. However, we also recognize that the development
in communication technologies means the decrease of TH . Second, unskilled
workers are equally productive under the same level of HQ-services once they
work in firms. This is because firms are able to organize their production
in the same way whatever the plant’s location. Furthermore, because of
the existence of a perfectly competitive traditional sector in each of the two
regions, the nominal wage rate of the unskilled (7) is unaffected by the re-
location of the industrial plants.
The output of the M-sector is shipped at a positive cost according to the
iceberg technology: when one unit of the differentiated product is moved from
region r to region s 6= r, only a fraction 1/Trs arrives at destination where
Trs > 1. Here, Trs may be different from Tsr, representing an asymmetry in
transport conditions. Within each region, transportation is costless. Thus,
if a firm has a single plant for variety i in region r, and serves the two
regions from the plant, then using (4), the demand for variety i (including
the consumption in transportation) is such that
qr(i) = µYrpr(i)
−σP σ−1r + µYs[ps(i)Trs]
−σP σ−1s Trs (9)
where Pr (resp. Ps) is the price index of the differentiated good in region r
(s), which is defined later. Next, given that the marginal production cost of
a variety at a plant in each region is a constant while fixed costs are needed
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for an additional plant, it never happens that a firm has a plant in both
regions while one region is served from the two plants. Thus, if a firm has
a plant for variety i in both regions, each plant serves the regional demand
given respectively by
qr(i) = µYrpr(i)
−σP σ−1r (10)
qs(i) = µYsps(i)
−σP σ−1s (11)
LetM rs (resp. m
r
s) be the set (resp. the mass) of firms whose headquarters
are in region r and a single plant in region s, with r, s = A,B.The profit of
firm i ∈M rr with r = A,B is as follows:
pirr = pr(i)qr(i)− wHr f − wLr c(Sr)qr(i)
which yields, using (9), the equilibrium mill price charged by the plant located
in region r:
p∗r(i) =
wLr c(Sr)
ρ
i ∈M rr (12)
Similarly, the profit of firm i ∈M rs with r 6= s is
pirs = ps(i)qs(i)− wHr f − wLs c(Sr)THqs(i) (13)
So that the equilibrium mill price charged by the plant located in region s is
as follows:
p∗s(i) =
wLs c(Sr)TH
ρ
i ∈M rs and r 6= s (14)
Let M rmp (resp. m
r
mp) be the set (resp. the mass) of multi-plant (mp) firms
whose headquarters are in region r and a plant in each region. The profit of
firm i ∈M rmp is
pirmp = pr(i)qr(i) + ps(i)qs(i)
−wHr (1 + α)f − wLr c(Sr)qr(i)− wLs c(Sr)THqs(i) (15)
which yields, using (10) and (11), we have the same equilibrium mill price
charged by each plant in region r and region s as (12) and (14) respectively.
Using (5), (12) and (14), and recalling that a plant of each multi-plant
firm serves only the region where it locates, we have the regional price index
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in region r as follows:
Pr =
{(
mrr +m
r
mp
)(wLr c(Sr)
ρ
)−(σ−1)
+
(
msr +m
s
mp
)(wLr c(Ss)TH
ρ
)−(σ−1)
+ T−(σ−1)sr
[
mrs
(
wLs c(Sr)TH
ρ
)−(σ−1)
+mss
(
wLs c(Ss)
ρ
)−(σ−1)]}−1/(σ−1)
(16)
in which the first two terms correspond to the varieties produced in region
r and the last two for those imported from region s. The real wages of the
unskilled and skilled workers are defined as follows:
ωLr = w
L
r /P
µ
r r = A,B
ωHr = w
H
r /P
µ
r r = A,B
For a given distribution of HQs and plants between the two regions, the
equilibrium profits may be obtained as follows:
pir∗r = k1[w
L
r c(Sr)]
−(σ−1)(YrP σ−1r + YsP
σ−1
s T
−(σ−1)
rs )− wHr f r 6= s (17)
pir∗s = k1[w
L
s c(Sr)TH ]
−(σ−1)(YrP σ−1r T
−(σ−1)
sr +YsP
σ−1
s )−wHr f r 6= s (18)
pir∗mp = k1[w
L
r c(Sr)]
−(σ−1)YrP σ−1r +k1[w
L
s c(Sr)TH ]
−(σ−1)YsP σ−1s −wHr (1+α)f
r 6= s (19)
where
k1 ≡ µ(σ − 1)
σ−1
σσ
is a positive constant. Therefore, the free entry condition becomes
max{piA∗A , piA∗B , piA∗mp, piB∗A , piB∗B , piB∗mp} = 0 (20)
which implies that the wage paid to the skilled workers comes from the
operating profits earned by plants.
Finally, since the HQ of each single-plant firm requires a fixed amount of
skilled workers f , and that of each multi-plant firm requires (1 + α)f , the
skilled-labor constraint in the economy is:∑
r=A,B
(mrA +m
r
B)f +m
r
mp(1 + α)f = S (21)
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3 Spatial equilibrium when the HQs are ag-
glomerated
In the rest of the paper, we focus on the case where all HQs locate in region
A, and examine the equilibrium patterns of plant distribution. In this sec-
tion, we obtain the equilibrium conditions for each possible pattern of plant
distribution.
The assumption that all HQs are agglomerated in region A implies that
mA = m, mAA +m
A
B +m
A
mp = m, m
B
A = m
B
B = m
B
mp = 0
and the skilled labor constraint (21) becomes
(mAA +m
A
B)f + (m−mAA −mAB)(1 + α)f = S (22)
Using (12) and (14), and recalling the note bellow (15), the equilibrium mill
price at the production site in each region is given by
p∗A = p
∗
A(i) =
c(S)
ρ
i ∈MAA and i ∈MAmp (23)
p∗B = p
∗
B(i) =
c(S)TH
ρaB
i ∈MAA and i ∈MAmp (24)
For convenience, we introduce the following notation:
θAA ≡
mAA
m
θAB ≡
mAB
m
θAmp ≡
mAmp
m
= 1− θAA − θAB (24a)
φH ≡
(
p∗A
p∗B
)σ−1
=
(
aB
TH
)σ−1
φAB ≡ T−(σ−1)AB φBA ≡ T−(σ−1)BA
By definition, φ
1/(σ−1)
H represents the ratio of the mill price in region A over
that in region B, which account for both the communication costs and the
wage differential (i.e. the productivity differential of unskilled workers in the
T-sector). When information transfer were costless, then TH = 1, and hence
φH takes the values a
σ−1
B ≥ 1; when information transfer were impossible,
then TH =∞, so φH = 0. The index φAB (resp. φBA) measures the accessi-
bility of the differentiated varieties produced in region A (in region B) to the
market in region B (in region A), taking values between 0 (when prohibitive
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transport costs) and 1 (zero transport costs). Thus, φAB and φBA represent
the degree of market integration in the two-region economy.
When all HQs locate in region A, using (7), (16) and (21), we have the
price index in each region as follows:
PA =
c(S)
ρ
m−1/(σ−1)
[(
1− θAB
)
+ θABφHφBA
]−1/(σ−1)
(25)
PB =
c(S)
ρ
m−1/(σ−1)
[(
1− θAA
)
φH + θ
A
AφAB
]−1/(σ−1)
(26)
whereas regional incomes become
YA = Sw
H
A + L/2 YB = L/2 (27)
Using (7), (16), (17), (18), (19), (21) and (27), we obtain the profit of firms
in each type as follows:
piA∗A =
µf(1 + α− αθAA − αθAB)
σS
×
[
SwHA + L/2
(1− θAB) + θABφHφBA
+
L/2φAB
(1− θAA)φH + θAAφAB
]
− wHA f (28)
piA∗B =
µf(1 + α− αθAA − αθAB)
σS
φH
×
[
(SwHA + L/2)φBA
(1− θAB) + θABφHφBA
+
L/2
(1− θAA)φH + θAAφAB
]
− wHA f (29)
piA∗mp =
µf(1 + α− αθAA − αθAB)
σS
×
[
SwHA + L/2
(1− θAB) + θABφHφBA
+
φHL/2
(1− θAA)φH + θAAφAB
]
− (1 + α)wHA f
(30)
3.1 Six locational patterns of plant distribution
- a preliminary exposition
In our economy, when all HQs are agglomerated in region A, there exist six
possible patterns of plant distribution:
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Pattern A All plants are located in region A (together with their HQs).
Pattern B All plants are located in region B (separated from their HQs).
Pattern A-B All firms have single plants, some of which locate in region
A, whereas the rest in region B.
Pattern A-mp Some firms have single plants in region A, whereas the rest
are multi-plant firms with a single plant in each region.
Pattern B-mp Some firms have single plants in region B, whereas the rest
are multi-plant firms with one plant in each region.
Pattern mp All firms are of multi-plant, with one plant in each region.
For each pattern, we examine the conditions under which it is an equilib-
rium. Before conducting formal analyses (in the next subsection), however,
in this subsection we explain intuitively which pattern is likely to be realized
when. To do so, it is convenient to introduce the following indexes:
ξAB ≡
(
wLAc(S)
wLBc(S)THTBA
)σ−1
=
(
aB
THTBA
)σ−1
= φBAφH (31)
ξBA ≡
(
wLBc(S)TH
wLAc(S)TAB
)σ−1
=
(
TH
aBTAB
)σ−1
=
φAB
φH
(32)
implying that
ξABξ
B
A =
(
1
TABTBA
)σ−1
< 1 (33)
ξBA
ξAB
=
{(
TH
aB
)2
TBA
TAB
}σ−1
(34)
By definition,
(
ξAB
)1/(σ−1)
represents the ratio of the marginal production
cost of a variety in region A (and supplying it to region A) over the marginal
cost of producing a unit of a variety in region B and transporting to region A.
In other word, ξAB measures the relative cost advantage of region B over region
A when serving to the market A (i.e., the market in region A). If ξAB > 1,
region B has a cost advantage in market A; whereas if ξAB < 1, region A
has a cost advantage in market A. Likewise, ξBA measures the relative cost
advantage of region A over region B when serving to the market B (i.e., the
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market in region B). If ξBA > 1, region A has a cost advantage in market B;
whereas if ξBA < 1, region B has a cost advantage in market B.
Since the inequality (33) means that
ξAB > 1⇒ ξBA < 1
we can conclude that
ξAB > 1⇒ {region B has a cost advantage in both markets} (35)
Likewise, since
ξBA > 1⇒ ξAB < 1
we can conclude that
ξBA > 1⇒ {region A has a cost advantage in both markets} (36)
For a preliminary study, let us first consider an extreme case such that
α = 1 and hence no multi-plant firm emerge. 2 In this case, there exist only
three possible equilibrium patterns, i.e., Pattern A, Pattern B and Pattern
A-B. For an illustration, we set α = 1 and µ/σ = 0.5. Then, we can obtain
the domain of each equilibrium pattern in the (ξAB , ξ
B
A ) space as in Figure 1.
(For the exact derivation of the results in Figure 1, see Section 3.2.)
Figure 1
In Figure 1, the horizontal axis (resp. vertical axis) represents the pa-
rameter ξAB (resp. ξ
B
A ). Because of condition (35), the relevant region of two
parameters is below the hyperbola, ξABξ
B
A = 1. Consider first point a in the
figure. Since ξBA > 1 at this point, we know by (35) that region A has a cost
advantage in both markets; hence, all firms should have plants in region A.
By the same reason, in the parameter area where ξBA > 1 and ξ
A
Bξ
B
A < 1, all
firms should have plants in region A. By (32)
ξBA > 1⇔
TH
aB
> TAB
2When α = 1, no multi-plant firm can exist in equilibrium. Indeed, if a multi-plant
firm (producing the same variety at two plants) earns the zero profit (i.e., the equilibrium
profit), then the combined profits of two independent firms, each producing a new different
variety, should be positive (because of less competition). This contradicts the equilibrium.
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Hence, all single-plants choose to locate in region A, when the communication
cost TH (between HQs in region A and plants) is very high, the wage rate in
region B, 1/aB, is not too low, while the transport cost from region A to B
is not too high, which is not surprising.
By contrast, in the area where ξAB > 1 and ξ
A
Bξ
B
A < 1, region B has a
cost advantage in both markets, and hence all single-plants should locate in
region B. By (31),
ξAB > 1⇔ aB > THTBA
This happens, again not surprisingly, when the labor cost advantage, aB, of
region B is very large, the communication cost TH is not very high, while
the transport cost from region B to A is relatively low.
Inside the square in Figure 1, since ξAB < 1 and ξ
B
A < 1, no region has a
cost advantage in both regions, implying that region A has a cost advantage
only in market A whereas region B only in market B. Hence, it is not clear
a priori which region is better for single-plant firms. However, at point a′ in
Figure 1, for example, the ratio ξBA/ξ
A
B is relatively large, implying that for the
location of single-plants, region A has a more cost advantage in comparison
with region B. In particular, suppose that transport costs are symmetric so
that TAB = TBA. Then, we have by (34) that
ξBA
ξAB
=
(
TH
aB
)2(σ−1)
when TAB = TBA
Hence, when TH/aB is relatively large (i.e., communication costs are rela-
tively high in comparison with the labor cost advantage, aB, of region B),
then region A has a more cost advantage in comparison with region B. Fur-
thermore, we can see by (27) that region A has a larger market than region
B. Hence in the area A above the broken curve cd in Figure 1, all firms
choose region A for the location for their plants. 3 By the opposite reason,
in the domain to the right of the broken curve ec in Figure 1, firms choose
region B for their plants.
Finally, in the domain A-B in Figure 1, it happens that some firms choose
region A for their plants, whereas the rest choose region B. Each point in
the domain A-B is either close to the origin O and/or close to the diagonal
Oc. When a point is close to the origin, each region is in a big disadvantage
3In Figure 1, apart of the broken curve cd is below the diagonal 0c. This is because
the market A is larger than market B, and hence firms choose region A for their plants
even when the ratio ξAB/ξ
B
A is a little smaller than 1.
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in supplying the product to the other region. Hence, some plants should
locate in region A while focusing on market A, whereas the rest in region
B while focusing on market B. When a point is close to the diagonal Oc,
the relative cost advantage of neither region is large. In this case, in order
to avoid competition, plants should be dispersed between the two regions.
In particular, we can see by (31) and (32) that when transportation costs
TAB and TBA are very large, both ξ
A
B and ξ
B
A are very small. Hence, not
surprisingly, plants should be dispersed between the two regions.
We can also show that when µ/σ becomes smaller (i.e., the expenditure
share µ on the differentiated goods is smaller and/or the degree of product
differentiation, 1/σ, is smaller), the two broken curves in Figure 1 become
more symmetric with respect to the diagonal Oc. This is because the ag-
gregate income SwHA of skilled workers in region A becomes smaller as µ/σ
becomes smaller (see (28) and (29)), and hence the difference between the
aggregate incomes of two regions becomes smaller.
Now, we consider the more realistic case such that α < 1, and examine
the emergence of multi-plant firms. For an illustration, we set α = 0.2 and
µ/σ = 0.5, and obtain the domain of each equilibrium location pattern of
plants in the (ξAB , ξ
B
A ) space as in Figure 2, which is a modified version of
Figure 1. (Note that we keep µ/σ = 0.5 is both figures.) Given α = 0.2 < 1,
the additional cost for setting up the second plant is relatively small. Thus,
as shown in Figure 2, multi-plant firms emerge when both ξAB and ξ
B
A are
small. Indeed, Figure 2 happens to represent the generic case for equilibrium
location patterns under the possibility of multi-plant firms.
Figure 2
In the domains outside the square in Figure 2 where ξAB > 1 and ξ
B
A > 1
there is no change from Figure 1. Indeed, when ξBA > 1, for example, region
A has a lower marginal cost for providing a variety to either market. Thus,
every firm chooses to have a single plant in region A, without bothering
about the second plant. Likewise, when ξAB > 1, all firms have single plants
in region B.
Inside the square in Figure 2 where ξAB < 1 and ξ
B
A < 1, region A (resp.
region B) has a lower marginal cost in providing a variety to market A
(resp. market B), but a higher marginal cost in providing it to market B
(resp. market A). Thus, now, each firm must face the trade-off between the
additional fixed cost from setting the second plant and a high marginal cost
in serving the two markets from a single-plant.
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In the domain A inside the square in Figure 2, the value of ξBA is rather
close to 1, implying that, in terms of marginal supply cost to the market B,
region A dose not have a great disadvantage to region B. Thus, avoiding the
additional fixed cost from setting up the second plant, every firm chooses to
have a single-plant in region A and to serve the product to the two markets.
Likewise, in the domain B inside the square in Figure 2, all firms choose to
have single-plants in region B.
In the domain mp in Figure 2, however, both ξAB and ξ
B
A are very small,
meaning that, in terms of marginal supply cost, a plant in one region has a
big disadvantage in supplying the product to the other region in comparison
with a plant in the other region. Hence, accepting the additional fixed cost
of the second plant, all firms choose to have two plants, one in each region.
Next, in the domain A-mp in Figure 2, ξBA is in the middle between 1 and
0, implying that, in terms of the marginal cost in serving the product to
market B, a plant in region A has a significant, but not fatal, disadvantage
in comparison with a plant in region B. In this situation, some firms choose
to have single plants in region A, whereas the rest choose to have two plants.
Notice that, in market B, each two-plant firm has a larger market share than
a single-plant firm (having a plant in region A), due to the fact that ξBA < 1
and the marginal cost pricing given by (23) and (24). However, these multi-
plant firms involve an additional fixed costs. Thus, the two type of firms can
co-exist in the domain A-mp in Figure 2. Likewise, in the domain B-mp,
some firms have single-plants in region B, while the rest have two plants.
When the values of α and µ/σ change, the boundary of each domain in
Figure 2 change, of course. To examine this issue precisely, however, we need
to determine the boundary of each domain precisely, which is the task of the
next subsection.
3.2 Equilibrium conditions for six locational patterns
In this subsection, we obtain the equilibrium conditions for each locational
pattern, using the profit functions (28) to (30). First, the next lemma iden-
tifies the necessary and sufficient condition for all HQs to be agglomerated
in region A (See Appendix B for the proof).
Lemma 3.1 All HQs are agglomerated in region A when the following con-
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dition holds:
c(0) ≥ TH
T
µ/(σ−1)
AB
c(m). (37)
In the right-hand side of (37), the term TH represents the decrease in
communication costs made by a firm when its HQ moves together with its
plant from A to B, whereas the term T
µ/(σ−1)
AB reflects the increase in the price
index of the M-good borne by the skilled workers who move to B with the
HQ. Hence, the inequality above means that all firms choose to agglomerate
their HQs provided that the Marshallian externalities are sufficiently strong
with respect to the ratio of these two opposite effects.
In the rest of the paper, we always assume that condition (37) holds,
and hence all HQs are agglomerated together in region A. Then, utilizing
parameters ξAB and ξ
B
A defined by (31) and (32), we obtain the equilibrium
conditions for each pattern of plant-distribution. By definition (31) and (32),
the effective domain of the parameter space, (ξAB ,ξ
B
A ), is always restricted to
the area,
ξAB > 0, ξ
B
A > 0 and ξ
A
Bξ
B
A < 1 (38)
which is taken as granted in the following discussion.
3.2.1 Pattern A
Setting piA∗A = 0 in (28), the wage rate of skilled labor in region A under
Pattern A can be obtained as follows (See Appendix C for the derivation):
wHA =
Lµ/σ
S(1− µ/σ) (39)
Clearly, wHA increases when the share of the industrial sector (µ) and the
degree of product differentiation (1/σ) rise. This is because the demand for
each variety increases. Likewise, wHA increases with the increase of unskilled
labor (L). This is because the income in both regions increases. Whereas
wHA decreases with the increase of skilled labor (S). The increase in the size
of skilled workers causes two effects: first, the income increases in region A;
second, the equilibrium number of firms increases. The second effect cancels
out the first effect on the consumption by skilled workers. But the second
effect remains on the consumption by unskilled workers. Furthermore, the
wage of skilled labor is independent from the communication costs and the
transportation costs because of the iceberg technology.
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Substituting (39) into (27), the ratio of regional incomes in the two regions
is given by
YA
YB
= 1 +
2µ/σ
1− µ/σ (39a)
which increases as µ/σ increases, not surprisingly.
Using the wage function (39), we can obtain the following lemma which
gives the equilibrium condition for Pattern A (See Appendix C for the proof).
Lemma 3.2 Suppose that (37) holds. Then, Pattern A in which all plants
are located in region A together with their HQs is a spatial equilibrium when
the following condition holds:
ξBA ≥ max
{
1− µ/σ
1− µ/σ + 2α,
1− µ/σ
2− (1 + µ/σ)ξAB
}
(40)
Notice that when α ≥ 1+µ/σ
2
, condition (40) reduces to the following one:
ξBA ≥
1− µ/σ
2− (1 + µ/σ)ξAB
(41)
which represents the domain A shown in Figure 1. By contrast, when α <
1+µ/σ
2
, condition (40) defines the domain A shown in Figure 2. It can be
readily seen by (40) that the domain A in Figure 2 continuously expands
downwards as the value of the fixed cost parameter, α, of the second plant
increases up to (1 + µ/σ)/2.
3.2.2 Pattern B
Setting piA∗B = 0 in (29), we obtain the wage rate of skilled labor in region
A, which turns our to be exactly the same as (39) (See Appendix D for the
derivation). The following lemma gives the equilibrium condition for Pattern
B (See Appendix D for the proof).
Lemma 3.3 Suppose that (37) holds. Then, Pattern B in which all plants
are located in region B is a spatial equilibrium when the following condition
holds:
ξAB ≥ max
{
1 + µ/σ
1 + µ/σ + 2α
,
1 + µ/σ
2− (1− µ/σ)ξBA
}
(42)
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Notice that when α ≥ 1−µ/σ
2
, condition (42) reduces to the following one:
ξAB ≥
1 + µ/σ
2− (1− µ/σ)ξBA
(43)
which represents the domain B shown in Figure 1. By contrast, when α <
1−µ/σ
2
, condition (42) defines the domain B shown in Figure 2. It can be
readily seen by (42) that the domain B in Figure 2 continuously expands
toward the left as the value of the fixed cost parameter, α, of the second
plant increases up to (1− µ/σ)/2.
3.2.3 Pattern A-B
In terms of the shares of the three types of firms defined in (24a), Pattern
A-B means θAmp = 0, 0 < θ
A
A < 1 and 0 < θ
A
B = 1 − θAA < 1. Setting
piA∗A = pi
A∗
B = 0 in (28) and (29), again, we obtain exactly the same wage
rate of skilled labor as (39) (See Appendix E for the derivation). Thus, the
income ratio YA/YB remains the same as (39a). We also have the following
share of firms whose plants are located in region B (See Appendix E for the
derivation):
θAB =
(1 + µ/σ)ξABξ
B
A + (1− µ/σ)− 2ξBA
2(1− ξBA )(1− ξAB)
≡ θ˜AB (44)
Since ξABξ
B
A < 1, this implies that the share of firms which locate their plants
only in region B increases as µ/σ decreases, that is, the income ratio YA/YB
decreases.
The following lemma gives the equilibrium condition for Pattern A-B (See
Appendix E for the proof).
Lemma 3.4 Suppose that (37) holds. Then, Pattern A-B in which all firms
have single plants, some of which locate in region A, whereas the rest in
region B, is a spatial equilibrium when the following condition holds:
max
{
2ξAB − 1− µ/σ
(1− µ/σ)ξAB
,
1− ξAB − α
1− (1 + α)ξAB
, 0
}
< ξBA <
1− µ/σ
2− (1 + µ/σ)ξAB
(45)
The left-hand side of (45) defines the border between the domain A-B
and the domain A in Figure 2. On the other hand, the right-hand side of
(45) defines the lower border of the domain A-B. When 1−µ/σ
2
≥ α (which
19
is the case for Figure 2), the left-hand side of (45) gives the V-shaped lower
boundary of domain A-B depicted in Figure 2. Whereas, when 1−µ/σ
2
< α,
the bottom part of the V-shaped lower boundary of the domain A-B is cut
by the horizontal axis.
3.2.4 Pattern A-mp
In terms of the shares of the three types of firms defined in (24a), Pattern
A-mp means θAB = 0, 0 < θ
A
A < 1 and 0 < θ
A
mp = 1 − θAA < 1. Setting
piA∗A = pi
A∗
mp = 0 in (28) and (30), again, we obtain exactly the same wage
rate of skilled labor as (39) (See Appendix F for the derivation). We also
have the following share of firms whose plants are located in region A (See
Appendix F for the derivation):
θAA =
{(1− α)− (1 + α)µ/σ} − (1 + α)(1− µ/σ)ξBA
α(1− µ/σ)(1− ξBA )
≡ θˆAA (46)
The following lemma gives the equilibrium condition for Pattern A-mp (See
Appendix F for the proof).
Lemma 3.5 Suppose that (37) holds. Then, Pattern A-mp in which some
firms have single plants in region A, whereas the rest are multi-plant firms
with a single plant in each region, is a spatial equilibrium when the following
condition holds:
max
{
1− α− µ/σ − αµ/σ
1 + α− µ/σ − αµ/σ , 0
}
< ξBA
< min
{
1− ξAB − α
1− (1 + α)ξAB
,
1− µ/σ
1− µ/σ + 2α
}
(47)
The left-hand side of (47) defines the border between the domain A-mp
and the domain mp, whereas the right-hand side of (47) defines the borders
between the domain A-mp and the domain A and between the domain A-
mp and the domain A-B in Figure 2. When 1+µ/σ
2
≥ α (which is the case
for Figure 2), the lower boundary of the domain A-mp is apart from the
horizontal axis. Whereas, when 1+µ/σ
2
< α < 1, the domain A-mp locates
around the origin.
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3.2.5 Pattern B-mp
In terms of the shares of the three types of firms defined in (24a), Pattern
B-mp means θAA = 0, 0 < θ
A
B < 1 and 0 < θ
A
mp = 1 − θAB < 1. Setting
piA∗B = pi
A∗
mp = 0 in (29) and (30), again, we obtain exactly the same wage
rate of skilled labor as (39) (See Appendix G for the derivation). We also
have the following share of firms whose plants are located in region B (See
Appendix G for the derivation):
θAB = −
1− α + µ/σ + αµ/σ − (1 + α)(1 + µ/σ)ξAB
α(1− µ/σ)(1− ξAB)
≡ θˇAB (48)
The following lemma gives the equilibrium condition for Pattern B-mp
(See Appendix G for the proof).
Lemma 3.6 Suppose that (37) holds. Then, Pattern B-mp in which some
firms have single plants in region B, whereas the rest are multi-plant firms
with a single plant in each region, is a spatial equilibrium when the following
condition holds:
1− α + µ/σ + αµ/σ
1 + α+ µ/σ + αµ/σ
< ξAB < min
{
1 + µ/σ
1 + µ/σ + 2α
,
1− ξBA − α
1− (1 + α)ξBA
}
(49)
The left-hand side of (49) defines the border between the domain B-mp and
the domain mp in Figure 2. On the other hand, when 1−µ/σ
2
≥ α (which is
the case for Figure 2), the right-hand side of (49) gives the borders between
the domain B-mp and the domain B and between the domain B-mp and the
domain A-B in Figure 2, whereas, when 1−µ/σ
2
< α, only the border between
the domain B-mp and the domain B is defined by the right-hand side of (49).
3.2.6 Pattern mp
Setting piA∗mp = 0 in (30), again, we obtain exactly the same wage rate of skilled
labor as (39) (See Appendix G for calculation). The following lemma gives
the equilibrium condition for Pattern mp (See Appendix G for the proof).
Lemma 3.7 Suppose that (37) holds. Then, Pattern mp in which all firms
are of multi-plant is a spatial equilibrium only when 0 < α < 1−µ/σ
1+µ/σ
and the
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following two conditions hold:
ξBA ≤
1− α− µ/σ − αµ/σ
1 + α− µ/σ − αµ/σ (50)
ξAB ≤
1− α+ µ/σ + αµ/σ
1 + α+ µ/σ + αµ/σ
(51)
Conditions (50) and (51) define the domain mp shown in Figure 2. By (50)
and (51), we can see that the domain mp in Figure 2 shrinks with a increase
in the additional fixed costs α.
We may summarize the results obtained in this section as follows:
Proposition 3.1 Pattern mp, in which all firms have one plant in each
region, emerges under a strong relative cost advantage of region A over region
B when serving to the market A and a strong relative cost advantage of region
B over region A when serving to the market B. As region A loses a relative
cost advantage over region B when serving to the market A, some plants
located in region A shift to region B. Whereas, as region B loses a relative
cost advantage over region A when serving to the market B, some plants
located in region B shift to region A.
4 The impact of economic integration on the
distribution of plants
In this section, we explore the impact of decreasing communication costs
between HQs and plants (φH increases) and decreasing transportation costs
of differentiated products (φBA and φAB increase), assuming that Marshallian
externalities are strong enough for (37) to hold.
4.1 Reducing communication costs
In this subsection, we examine the impact of decreasing communication costs
on the location pattern of plants (i.e. increasing φH
4). From (31) and (32),
ξAB increases and ξ
B
A decreases with a decrease in communication costs TH .
This means that locating plants in region B becomes more attractive to serve
4The increase of φH may also arise from the decrease in the difference of productivity
between region A and region B.
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region A and locating plants in region A becomes less desirable to serve region
B. Thus the number of plants in region A decreases whereas that in region
B increases.
To illustrate the shift of location pattern with decreasing communication
costs, observe that when the value of TABTBA is fixed, equation (33) defines
a hyperbola. In Figure 3, two hyperbolas are depicted under different value
of TABTBA. This hyperbola shifts away from the origin as TABTBA becomes
smaller. We can see by (31) and (32) that as the value of TH/aB decreases,
the point (ξAB ,ξ
B
A ) moves on each hyperbola from the upper left to the lower
right.
Figure 3
Overlapping Figures 2 and 3, we obtain Figure 4. We can see that (34) de-
fines the line whose slope is the right-hand side of (34). In Figure 4, the line
is depicted under the smallest communication costs. The point (ξAB , ξ
B
A ) does
not move over the line with decreasing communication costs. We can see in
Figure 4 that, when transportation costs of products are high like the auto-
mobile industry, the location pattern of plants shifts in the following order
as communication costs decrease: Pattern A → Pattern A-mp → Pattern
mp. Whereas, when transportation costs of products are low like the hard
disc drive industry, the location pattern of plants shifts in the following order
with decreasing communication costs: Pattern A→ Pattern A-B → Pattern
B. We can interpret the shifts of location pattern above in the following way:
multi-plants increase in the automobile firms with decreasing communication
costs, whereas single plants in region B increase in hard disc drive firms with
decreasing communication costs.
Figure 4
First, to show these results precisely, we focus on the case where the
location pattern shifts in the following order: Pattern A → Pattern A-mp
→ Pattern mp → Pattern B-mp → Pattern B. Using (40) and (47), we can
see that the shift from Pattern A to Pattern A-mp happens by an increase
in ξAB and a decrease in ξ
B
A . Assuming Pattern A-mp to hold, we obtain the
following result from (46):
∂θˆAA
∂φH
= − 2φAB
(1 + µ/σ)(φAB − φH)2 < 0 (52)
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This shows that the share of firms which locate single plants in region A
decreases and the share of firms which locate multi-plants increases gradually
with decreasing communication costs. Using (47) and (51), we can see that
the shift from Pattern A-mp to Pattern mp happens by an increase in ξAB
and a decrease in ξBA . Likewise, we can see that the location pattern of
plants shifts from Pattern mp to Pattern B-mp by an increase in ξAB and a
decrease in ξBA , using (49) and (51). Assuming that Pattern B-mp to hold
and considering a decrease in communication costs between HQs and plants
(φH increases), we can obtain the following result from (48):
∂θˇAB
∂φH
=
2φBA
(1− µ/σ)(1− φBAφH)2 > 0 (53)
This shows that the share of firms which locate single plants in region B
increases and the share of firms which have multi-plants decreases with a
decrease in communication costs. Using (43) and (49), we can see that the
shift from Pattern B-mp to Pattern B happens by a increase of ξAB and a
decrease of ξBA .
Furthermore, we need to examine which pattern emerges when the com-
munication costs are the smallest. Setting the smallest communication costs
TH = 1, we obtain the following result from (31) and (32):
ξAB =
(
aB
TBA
)σ−1
ξBA =
(
1
aBTAB
)σ−1
(54)
Using (50), (51) and (54), we can see that Pattern mp emerges under the
smallest communication costs when transportation costs are large and the
productivity difference of the unskilled between regions is small. Therefore,
when transportation costs are large and the productivity difference of the
unskilled between the regions is small, the location pattern shifts with de-
creasing communication costs in the following order: Pattern A → Pattern
A-mp→ Patternmp. This result imply that multi-plants in automobile firms,
which involve large transportation costs, increase with decreasing communi-
cation costs. Whereas, using (42), (49) and (54), when both of transportation
costs and the productivity difference of the unskilled are large, Pattern B or
Pattern B-mp emerge under the smallest communication costs. Thus, when
transportation costs and the productivity difference of the unskilled between
the regions are large, the location pattern shifts with decreasing communi-
cation costs in the following order: Pattern A → Pattern A-mp → Pattern
mp → Pattern B-mp → Pattern B.
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Next, we focus on the case where the location pattern of plants shifts
in the following order with decreasing communication costs: Pattern A →
Pattern A-B → Pattern B with a decrease of communication costs. Using
(40) and (45), we can see that the shift from Pattern A to Pattern A-B
happens by an increase in ξAB and a decrease in ξ
B
A when transportation costs
are small or when the additional fixed costs are rather large. Assuming
Pattern A-B to hold and considering a decrease in communication costs
between HQs and plants (φH increases), we can obtain the following result
from (44):
∂θ˜AB
∂φH
=
1
φAB
1 + µ/σ
2(1− φH/φAB)2 + φBA
1− µ/σ
2(1− φBAφH)2 > 0 (55)
This shows that the share of firms which have single plants in region B in-
creases and the share of firms which have single plants in region A decreases
gradually with decreasing communication costs. The shift from Pattern A-
B to Pattern B happens by an increase in ξAB and a decrease in ξ
B
A , using
(42) and (45). Furthermore, using (42) and (54), we can see that Pattern B
emerges under the smallest communication costs when transportation costs
are small. Therefore, when transportation costs are small, the location pat-
tern shifts with decreasing communication costs in the following order: Pat-
tern A→ Pattern A-B → Pattern B. This results implies that the hard disc
drive firms, which involve small transportation costs of their products, have
single plants in low wage countries with decreasing communication costs.
In addition, we examine the shift of location patterns on Pattern A-B.
Assuming that Pattern A-mp adjoins Pattern A-B on (ξAB ,ξ
B
A ) space, we can
see that the location pattern shifts from Pattern A-mp to Pattern A-B with
decreasing communication costs when the following conditions are satisfied:
1) α ≤ µ/σ or 2) α > µ/σ, ξAB > 1−α1+α and ξBA < 1−α1+α (See Appendix G for
the proof). Next, assuming that Pattern B-mp adjoins Pattern A-B on (ξAB ,
ξBA ) space, we can see that the location pattern shifts from Pattern B-mp to
Pattern A-B with decreasing communication costs (See Appendix H for the
proof).
The discussion above may then be summarized as follows.
Proposition 4.1 When transportation costs are large and the wage differ-
ence is small, the location pattern of plants shifts with decreasing communica-
tion costs in the following order: Pattern A→ Pattern A-mp→ Pattern mp.
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Whereas, when transportation costs are small, the location pattern of plants
shifts with decreasing communication costs in the following order: Pattern A
→ Pattern A-B → Pattern B.
4.2 Reducing transportation costs
In this subsection, we examine the impact of decreasing transportation costs
(i.e., increasing φAB and φBA) on the location pattern of plants. From (31)
and (32), we have ∂ξAB/∂φBA = φH and ∂ξ
B
A/∂φAB = φ
−1
H . These mean that,
when φH > 1 (or TH/aB > 1), the relative cost advantage of region B over
region A when serving to the market A decreases more with decreasing trans-
portation costs, whereas the relative cost advantage of region A over region B
when serving to the market B decreases less with decreasing transportation
costs. Onthe other hand, when φH < 1 (or TH/aB > 1), the relative cost
advantage of region B over region A when serving to the market A decreases
less with decreasing transportation costs, whereas the relative cost advantage
of region A over region B when serving to the market B decreases more with
decreasing transportation costs. Therefore, multi-plant firms become single-
plant firms with decreasing transportation costs. Furthermore, firms locating
single plants in region A increase when communication costs are high with
decreasing transportation costs, whereas firms locating single plants in region
B increase when communication costs are low with decreasing transportation
costs.
To illustrate the shift of location pattern with decreasing transportation
costs in Figures, observe that when the value (TH/aB)
2 is fixed and trans-
portation costs from region A and from region B are the same value, equation
(34) defines a line through the origin in Figure 5. As transportation costs
increase, the location pattern of plants shifts away from the origin along this
line. Since the slope of this line is T 2H/a
2
B, when communication costs are
high, the location pattern shifts in Figure 5 with decreasing transportation
costs in the following order: Pattern mp → Pattern A-mp → Pattern A.
Whereas, when communication costs are low, the location pattern shifts in
Figure 5 with decreasing transportation costs in the following order: Pattern
mp → Pattern B-mp → PatternB.
Figure 5
We examine the shift of location pattern when we set transportation
costs from region A and from region B take the same value. First, assuming
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that Pattern mp is held and using (47) and (50), we can see that, when
communication costs are large, the location pattern of plants shifts from
Pattern mp to Pattern A-mp with decreasing transportation costs, that is
an increase of ξAB and ξ
B
A . Whereas, using (49) and (51), we can see that
the location pattern of plants shifts from Pattern mp to Pattern B-mp with
decreasing transportation costs when communication costs are small.
Second, we examine Pattern A-mp. Assuming that Pattern A-mp to hold
and considering a decrease in transportation costs (ξAB and ξ
B
A increase), we
can derive the following results from (46):
∂θˆAA
∂φAB
=
2φH
(1 + µ/σ)(φAB − φH)2 > 0
∂θˆAA
∂φBA
= 0 (56)
These results show that the share of firms which have multi-plants decreases
and the share of firms which have single plants only in region A increases
when transportation costs from region A to region B decrease. Whereas
the share of multi-plants firms and that of firms which have single plants in
region A do not change when transportation costs from region B to region
A decrease. The pace of the relocation of plants to region A becomes slower
as the difference of market size (µ/σ) increases. Furthermore, assuming that
Pattern A-mp adjoins Pattern A-B on (ξAB ,ξ
B
A )-space, we can see that the shift
from Pattern A-mp to Pattern A-B happens with decreasing transportation
costs (See Appendix I for the proof). Whereas, from (40) and (47), we can
see that the location pattern of plants shifts from Pattern A-mp to Pattern
A with decreasing transportation costs, that is an increase in ξAB and ξ
B
A .
Third, we examine Pattern B-mp. Assuming that Pattern B-mp to hold
and considering a decrease in transportation costs (ξAB and ξ
B
A increase), we
have the following results from (48):
∂θˇAB
∂φBA
=
2φH
(1− µ/σ)(1− φBAφH)2 > 0
∂θˇAB
∂φAB
= 0 (57)
which shows that the share of firms which have multi-plants decreases and
the share of firms which have single plants in region B increases when trans-
portation costs from region B to region A decrease. Whereas the share of
firms which have multi-plants does not change when transportation costs
from region A to region B decrease. The relocation of multi-plants becomes
faster pace when the difference of market size (µ/σ) is large. From (42) and
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(49), we can see that the location pattern of plants shifts from Pattern B-
mp to Pattern B with decreasing transportation costs, that is an increase
in ξAB and ξ
B
A . Whereas we can see that the location pattern of plants shifts
from Pattern B-mp to Pattern A-B with decreasing transportation costs (See
Appendix I for the proof).
Forth, we examine Pattern A-B. Setting dφAB = dφBA ≡ dφT and dφH =
0, we have
dθ˜AB
dφT
Q 0 ⇔ −(1− ξAB)2 +
1− µ/σ
1 + µ/σ
φ2H
(
1− ξBA
)2 Q 0 (58)
From this expression, we can see that the share of firms which have single
plants in region A decreases and the share of firms which have single plants
in region B increases when 1) φH is large, 2)ξ
A
B is large and 3) ξ
B
A is small,
that is small communication costs. Whereas the share of firms which have
single plants in region A increases and the share of firms which have single
plants in region B decreases when 1) φH is small, 2)ξ
A
B is small and 3) ξ
B
A
is large, that is large communication costs. Furthermore, with decreasing
transportation costs, the location pattern shifts from Pattern A-B to Pattern
A when ξAB <
σ
σ+µ
, whereas the location pattern shifts from Pattern A to
Pattern A-B when ξAB >
σ
σ+µ
(See Appendix J for the proof). In addition,
the location pattern shifts from Pattern A-B to Pattern B with decreasing
transportation costs (See Appendix K for the proof).
The discussion above may be summarized as follows.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose that transportation costs from region A and from
region B takes the same value. Then, the number of the firms having plants
in both regions decreases with decrease transportation costs. When communi-
cation costs are small, the number of plants located in region A increases and
that of plants located in region B decreases with decreasing transportation
costs.
5 The welfare analysis
In this section, we examine the impact of decreasing communication costs on
the welfare of workers in the core and the periphery. Since the nominal wages
of the unskilled and the skilled are independent of communication costs, the
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impact of falling communication costs on the welfare is determined by the
change in the price index of manufactured goods in each region.
First, we examine the price index in region A. Using (25), we have
∂PA
∂φH
= − PA
σ − 1
θABφBA − (1− φHφBA)∂θAB/∂φH
(1− θAB) + θABφHφBA
under either Pattern A, Pattern mp or Pattern A-mp, since θAB = 0 and
∂θAB/∂φH = 0, we have ∂PA/∂φH = 0. Thus, the welfare in region A does
not change with decreasing communication costs under either pattern, since
all varieties are produced in region A. Under Pattern A-B (0 < θAB < 1),
using (44) and (55), we have:
θABφBA − (1− φHφBA)∂θAB/∂φH = −
(µ+ σ)φAB(1− φABφH)
2σ(φAB − φH)2 < 0
implying that ∂PA/∂φH > 0. Likewise, under Pattern B-mp (0 < θ
A
B < 1),
using (48) and (53), we have:
θABφBA − (1− φHφBA)∂θAB/∂φH = −
(1 + α)(σ + µ)φBA
α(σ − µ) < 0
implying that ∂PA/∂φH > 0. In either pattern, two opposing effects work.
First, the marginal cost of differentiated goods produced in region B de-
creases, which tends to increase PA. Second, the number of plants increases
in region B and decreases in region A, which tends to increase PA. How-
ever, the second effects dominates the first, and hence the welfare in region
A decreases under either Pattern A-B and Pattern B-mp.
Under Pattern B, since θAB = 1 and ∂θ
A
B/∂φH = 0, we have ∂PA/∂φH < 0.
Thus, under Pattern B, the welfare in region A increases with decreasing
communication costs. This is because the varieties made in region B are
produced at lower marginal cost due to lower communication costs.
Next, concerning the price index in region B, using (26), we have
∂PB
∂φH
= − PB
σ − 1
(1− θAA)− (φH − φAB)∂θAA/∂φH
(1− θAA)φH + θAAφAB
(59)
Under either Pattern B, Pattern mp or Pattern B-mp, since θAA = 0 and
∂θAA/∂φH = 0, we have ∂PB/∂φH < 0. Thus, the welfare in region B in-
creases. This is because varieties made in region B are produced at lower
marginal cost with a lower communication costs.
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Under Pattern A-B (0 < θAA < 1), using (44) and (55), we have:
(1− θAA)− (φH − φAB)∂θAA/∂φH =
1
φH(1− φHφBA) > 0
implying that ∂PB/∂φH < 0. Likewise, under Pattern A-mp (0 < θ
A
A < 1),
we have:
(1− θAA)− (φH − φAB)∂θAA/∂φH =
σ − µ
α(σ + µ)
> 0
implying that ∂PB/∂φH < 0. In either case, two effects work. First, the
marginal cost of differentiated goods produced in region B decreases. Second,
plants increase in region B and decrease in region A. Both effects reduce PB,
and hence increases the welfare in region B. Finally, under Pattern A, since
θAA = 1 and ∂θ
A
A/∂φH = 0, we have ∂PB/∂φH = 0, implying that the welfare
in region B does not change when Pattern A emerges.
We may summarize the result above as follows:
Proposition 5.1 When communication costs are rather large, all varieties
are produced in the core (=region A). In this case, all workers are unaffected
from the decrease in communication costs. By more decrease in communica-
tion costs, some varieties are produced in the periphery (=region B). In this
case, the unskilled living in the periphery are better off and the workers in
the core are worse off with decreasing communication costs. Finally, when
communication costs are small enough, all plants are located in the periph-
ery. In this case, all workers in both regions benefit from further lowering
communication costs.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, globalization is characterized by lower communication costs
between headquarters and plants and lower transportation costs of products.
Each firm has the headquarter and chooses either to have a single plant in
a region, or to have one plant in each region. Under the assumption that
all headquarters are agglomerated in the core and that the productivity of
unskilled workers in the traditional sector is higher in the core than in the
periphery, we have examined the impact of globalization on the location
pattern of plants between the core and the periphery.
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From our analysis, we understand that multi-plants increase with decreas-
ing communication costs when transportation costs of products are large due
to the government regulation and the cultural differences and when the pro-
ductivity difference of the skilled are small. This explains the fragmentation
of the production by the automobile industry. On the other hand, single
plants in the periphery increase with decreasing communication costs when
transportation costs are small. This is suited to the globalization of the pro-
duction by consumer electronics or the outsourcing of call centre. On the
welfare, with decreasing communication costs, we could see that the workers
in the core worse off and these in the periphery better off when the varieties
are produced in both regions under medium communication costs. When
communication costs are small enough, all plants are located in the periph-
ery. In this case, all workers in both regions benefit from further lowering
communication costs.
For further research, it is desirable to consider on the location of plants
producing intermediate goods as well as plants producing final goods. Re-
cently, the share of intermediate goods in trade has been increasing. By
introducing the plants which produce intermediate goods, the forward and
backward linkages would arise between the two types of plants, and we could
explain the overseas expansion of a company producing intermediate goods
as a factor of a fragmentation.
Appendix
A. The profit of firms whose HQs are in region B
Using (7), (16), (17), (18), (19), (21) and (27), we obtain the profit of firms
whose HQs are in region B as follows:
piB∗B =
µf(1 + α− αθAA − αθAB)
σS
×
[
(SwHA + L/2)φBA
(1− θAB) + θABφHφBA
+
L/2
(1− θAA)φH + θAAφAB
]
− wHB f (60)
piB∗A =
µf(1 + α− αθAA − αθAB)
σS
φH
×
[
SwHA + L/2
(1− θAB) + θABφHφBA
+
L/2φAB
(1− θAA)φH + θAAφAB
]
− wHB f (61)
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piB∗mp =
µf(1 + α− αθAA − αθAB)
σS
×
[
(SwHA + L/2)φH
(1− θAB) + θABφHφBA
+
L/2
(1− θAA)φH + θAAφAB
]
− (1 + α)wHB f
(62)
B. Proof of Lemma 3.1
Let us determine when the equilibrium conditions piB∗A ≤ 0, piB∗B ≤ 0, and
piB∗mp ≤ 0 hold. Since all skilled workers are to be in region A, it must be that
ωHA ≥ ωHB . Without loss of generality, we may assume that ωHA = ωHB , which
means
wHA =
P µB
P µA
wHB (63)
From the free entry condition (20), it must hold that piA∗B ≤ 0, piA∗A ≤ 0, and
piA∗mp ≤ 0. Using (60), (63) and piA∗B ≤ 0, it is readily verified that piB∗B ≤ 0
holds if and only if[
c(0)
c(m)
]σ−1
≥
[
(1− θA∗A )φH + θA∗A φAB
(1− θA∗B ) + θA∗B φHφBA
]µ/(σ−1)
T σ−1H . (64)
Using (61), (63) and piA∗A ≤ 0, it is then readily verified that piB∗A ≤ 0 holds if
and only if[
c(0)
c(m)
]σ−1
≥
[
(1− θA∗A )φH + θA∗A φAB
(1− θA∗B ) + θA∗B φHφBA
]µ/(σ−1)
T
−(σ−1)
H . (65)
Using (62), (63) and piA∗mp ≤ 0, it is then readily verified that piB∗mp ≤ 0 holds
if and only if (64) and (65) hold. Condition (65) is always satisfied when
(64) holds. Note that the right-hand side of (64) is strictly decreasing in θAA
and strictly increasing in θAB so that pi
B∗
A ≤ 0, piB∗B ≤ 0, and piB∗mp ≤ 0 hold as
long as (64) is satisfied for θA∗A = 1 and θ
A∗
B = 0, that is, when condition (37)
holds. Therefore, conditions piB∗B ≤ 0, piB∗A ≤ 0 and piB∗mp ≤ 0 hold if and only
if condition (37) holds.
C. For Pattern A
Pattern A means θAA = 1 and θ
A
B = 0. From (20), under Pattern A, the
equilibrium conditions are: piA∗A = 0, pi
A∗
B ≤ 0, piA∗mp ≤ 0, piB∗A ≤ 0, piB∗B ≤ 0
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and piB∗mp ≤ 0. Supposing (37) to hold, we determine when the conditions
piA∗A = 0, pi
A∗
B ≤ 0, piA∗mp ≤ 0 is satisfied under Pattern A. First, substituting
θAA = 1 and θ
A
B = 0 into (28) and setting pi
A∗
A = 0 yields the wage of skilled
labor in region A which turns out to be exactly the same as (39). Next,
substituting θAA = 1, θ
A
B = 0 and (39) into (29) and setting pi
A∗
B ≤ 0 yields
ξBA ≥
1− µ/σ
2− (1 + µ/σ)ξAB
. (66)
On the other hand, substituting θAA = 1, θ
A
B = 0 and (39) into (30) and
setting piA∗mp ≤ 0 yields
ξBA ≥
1− µ/σ
1− µ/σ + 2α (67)
Therefore, conditions piA∗A = 0, pi
A∗
B ≤ 0 and piA∗mp ≤ 0 are satisfied when (66)
and (67) hold. Conditions (66) and (66) can be expressed together as (40).
D. For Pattern B
Pattern B means θAA = 0 and θ
A
B = 1. From (20), under Pattern B, the
equilibrium conditions are: piA∗A ≤ 0, piA∗B = 0, piA∗mp ≤ 0, piB∗A ≤ 0, piB∗B ≤ 0 and
piB∗mp ≤ 0. Supposing (37) to hold, we determine when the conditions piA∗A ≤
0, piA∗B = 0 and pi
A∗
mp ≤ 0 are satisfied under Pattern B. First, substituting
θAA = 0 and θ
A
B = 1 into (29) and setting pi
A∗
B = 0 yield the wage of skilled
labor in region A which turns out to be exactly the same as (39). Next,
substituting θAA = 0, θ
A
B = 1 and (39) into (28) and setting pi
A∗
A ≤ 0 yield
ξAB ≥
1 + µ/σ
2− (1 + µ/σ)ξBA
(68)
On the other hand, substituting θAA = 0, θ
A
B = 1 and (39) into (30) and
setting piA∗mp ≤ 0 yield
ξAB ≥
1 + µ/σ
1 + µ/σ + 2α
(69)
Therefore, conditions piA∗A ≤ 0, piA∗B = 0 and piA∗mp ≤ 0 are satisfied when (68)
and (69) hold. Condition (68) and (69) can be expressed together as (42).
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E. For Pattern A-B
Pattern A-B means θAA + θ
A
B = 1, 0 < θ
A
B < 1 and 0 < θ
B
A < 1. From
(20), under Pattern A-B, the equilibrium conditions are: piA∗A = 0, pi
A∗
B = 0,
piA∗mp ≤ 0, piB∗A ≤ 0, piB∗B ≤ 0 and piB∗mp ≤ 0. Supposing (37) to hold, we
determine when the conditions piA∗A = 0, pi
A∗
B = 0 and pi
A∗
mp ≤ 0 are satisfied
under Pattern A-B. First, substituting θAA = 1− θAB into (28) and (29), and
setting piA∗A = pi
A∗
B = 0 yields the wage of skilled labor in region A which
turns out to be exactly the same as (39). Using this wage function, the share
of firms whose plants are located in region B can be obtained as (44). Next,
substituting θAA = 1− θAB, (39) and (44) into (30) and setting piA∗mp ≤ 0 yield
ξBA >
1− ξAB − α
1− (1 + α)ξAB
(70)
Setting θAB > 0 in (44) yield
ξBA >
2ξAB − 1− µ/σ
(1− µ/σ)ξAB
(71)
Likewise, setting θAB < 1 in (44) yields
ξBA ≤
1− µ/σ
2− (1 + µ/σ)ξAB
(72)
Therefore, conditions piA∗A = 0, pi
A∗
B = 0 and pi
A∗
mp ≤ 0 are satisfied when (70),
(71) and (72) hold. Considering that ξBA is positive by definition, conditions
(70), (71) and (72) can be expressed together as (45).
F. For Pattern A-mp
Pattern A-mp means 0 < θAA = 1 − θAmp < 1 and θAB = 0. From (20), under
Pattern A-mp, the equilibrium conditions are: piA∗A = 0, pi
A∗
B ≤ 0, piA∗mp = 0,
piB∗A ≤ 0, piB∗B ≤ 0 and piB∗mp ≤ 0. Supposing (37) to hold, we determine when
the conditions piA∗A = 0, pi
A∗
B ≤ 0 and piA∗mp = 0 are satisfied under Pattern A-
mp. First, substituting θAB = 0 into (28) and (30), and setting pi
A∗
A = pi
A∗
mp = 0
yields the wage of skilled labor in region A which turns out to be exactly the
same as (39). Using this wage function, the share of firms whose plants are
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located in region A can be obtained as (46).Next, substituting θAB = 0, (39)
and (46) into (29) and setting piA∗B ≤ 0 yield
ξBA ≤
1− ξAB − α
1− (1 + α)ξAB
(73)
Setting θAA > 0 in (46) yields
ξBA <
1− µ/σ
1− µ/σ + 2α (74)
Likewise, setting θAA < 1 in (46) yields
ξBA >
1− α− µ/σ − αµ/σ
1 + α− µ/σ − αµ/σ (75)
Therefore, piA∗A = 0, pi
A∗
B ≤ 0 and piA∗mp = 0 are satisfied when (73), (74) and
(75) hold. Considering that ξBA is positive by definition, conditions (73), (74)
and (75) can be expressed together as (47).
G. For Pattern B-mp
Pattern B-mp means 0 < θAB = 1 − θAmp < 1 and θAA = 0. From (20), under
Pattern B-mp, the equilibrium conditions are: piA∗A ≤ 0, piA∗B = 0, piA∗mp = 0,
piB∗A ≤ 0, piB∗B ≤ 0 and piB∗mp ≤ 0. Supposing (37) to hold, we determine when
the conditions piA∗A ≤ 0, piA∗B = 0 and piA∗mp = 0 are satisfied under Pattern B-
mp. First, substituting θAA = 0 into (29) and (30), and setting pi
A∗
B = pi
A∗
mp = 0
yield the wage of skilled labor in region A which turns out to be exactly the
same as (39). Using this wage function, the share of firms whose plants are
located in region B can be obtained as (48).Next, substituting θAB = 0, (39)
and (48) into (28) and setting piA∗A ≤ 0 yields
ξBA ≤
1− ξAB − α
1− (1 + α)ξAB
(76)
Setting θAB > 0 in (48) yields
ξAB <
1 + µ/σ
1 + µ/σ + 2α
(77)
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Likewise, setting θAB < 1 in (48) yields
ξBA >
1− α+ µ/σ + αµ/σ
1 + α + µ/σ + αµ/σ
(78)
Therefore, piA∗A ≤ 0, piA∗B = 0 and piA∗mp = 0 are satisfied when (76), (77) and
(78) hold. Considering that ξBA is positive by definition, conditions (76), (77)
and (78) can be expressed together as (49).
H. For Pattern mp
Pattern mp means θAA = θ
A
B = 0 and θ
A
mp = 1. From (20), under Pattern
mp, the equilibrium conditions are piA∗A ≤ 0, piA∗B ≤ 0, piA∗mp = 0, piB∗A ≤ 0,
piB∗B ≤ 0 and piB∗mp ≤ 0. Supposing (37) to hold, we determine when the
conditions piA∗A ≤ 0, piA∗B ≤ 0 and piA∗mp = 0 are satisfied under Pattern mp.
First, substituting θAA = θ
A
B = 0 into (30) and setting pi
A∗
mp = 0 yields the
wage of skilled labor in region A which turns out to be exactly the same as
(39). Next, substituting θAA = θ
A
B = 0 and (39) into (28) and setting pi
A∗
A ≤ 0
yields (50). On the contrary, substituting θAA = θ
A
B = 0 and (39) into (29)
and setting piA∗B ≤ 0 yields (51). Therefore, piA∗A ≤ 0, piA∗B ≤ 0 and piA∗mp = 0
are satisfied when (50) and (51) hold. Considering that ξBA is positive by
definition, Lemma 3.7 is verified.
I. For the shift of location pattern between Pattern
A-mp and Pattern A-B when communication costs
fall
The equilibrium condition for Pattern A-B (70) is rewritten as follows:
(−1 + α + ξAB)− ξBA (−1 + (1 + α)ξAB) ≥ 0 (79)
Whereas, the equilibrium condition for Pattern A-mp (73) is rewritten as
follows:
(−1 + α + ξAB)− ξBA (−1 + (1 + α)ξAB) ≤ 0 (80)
Using the first derivative of the left-hand side of (79) and (80) with φH , it
is verified that the location pattern of plants shifts from Pattern A-mp to
Pattern A-B with a decrease of communication costs when 1−α
2
1
ξAB
+ 1+α
2
ξBA <
1. Whereas the location pattern of plants shifts from Pattern A-B to Pattern
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A-mp with a decrease of communication costs when 1−α
2
1
ξAB
+ 1+α
2
ξBA > 1. From
(70) and (73), ξBA =
1−ξAB−α
1−(1+α)ξAB
which divides Pattern A-mp from Pattern A-B
in (ξAB , ξ
B
A )-space intersects
1−α
2
1
ξAB
+ 1+α
2
ξBA = 1 at ξ
A
B = ξ
B
A =
1−α
1+α
. Thus, the
location pattern of plants shifts from Pattern A-mp to Pattern A-B when
ξAB >
1−α
1+α
and ξBA <
1−α
1+α
. Whereas the location pattern of plants shifts from
Pattern A-B to Pattern A-mp when ξAB <
1−α
1+α
and ξBA >
1−α
1+α
. From (47),
σ−ασ−µ−αµ
σ+ασ−µ−αµ <
1−α
1+α
< σ−µ
σ−µ+2ασ holds when α > µ/σ and
σ−µ
σ−µ+2ασ ≤ 1−α1+α holds
when α ≤ µ/σ. Therefore, the location pattern shifts from Pattern A-mp
to Pattern A-B with a decrease of communication costs when the following
conditions are satisfied: 1) α ≤ µ/σ or 2) α > µ/σ, ξAB > 1−α1+α and ξBA < 1−α1+α .
Whereas the location pattern shifts from Pattern A-B to Pattern A-mp when
µ/σ < α, ξAB <
1−α
1+α
and ξBA >
1−α
1+α
.
J. For the shift of location pattern from Pattern B-mp
to Pattern A-B when the communication costs fall
We can rewrite (70) as (79), whereas, (76) as (80). From the first derivative
of the left-hand side of (79) and (80) with φH , the location pattern of plants
shifts from Pattern B-mp to Pattern A-B with a decrease of communication
costs when 1−α
2
1
ξAB
+ 1+α
2
ξBA < 1. The border condition between Pattern
B-mp and Pattern A-B ξBA =
1−ξAB−α
1−(1+α)ξAB
intersects 1−α
2
1
ξAB
+ 1+α
2
ξBA = 1 at
ξAB = ξ
B
A =
1−α
1+α
. Considering (49) and using 1−α
1+α
< 1−α+µ/σ+αµ/σ
1+α+µ/σ+αµ/σ
, the location
pattern of plants shifts from Pattern B-mp to Pattern A-B when ξAB >
1−α
1+α
and ξBA <
1−α
1+α
.
K. For the shift of location pattern to Pattern A-B
when transportation costs fall
The equilibrium condition for Pattern A-B (70) is expressed as follows:
ξBA
(
1− (1 + α)ξAB
)− (1− ξAB − α) ≥ 0
Whereas the equilibrium condition for Pattern A-mp (73) and for Pattern
B-mp (76) are expressed as follows:
ξBA
(
1− (1 + α)ξAB
)− (1− ξAB − α) ≤ 0
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Setting φT ≡ φAB = φBA, the first derivatives of the left-hand side of both
equations with φT are derived as (1 − (1 + α)ξBA ) ∂ξ
A
B
∂φT
+ (1 − (1 + α)ξAB) ∂ξ
B
A
∂φT
.
Using (47) and (49), this derivative is positive from 1
1+α
> σ−µ
σ−µ+2ασ and
1
1+α
> σ+µ
σ+µ+2ασ
. Therefore, the location pattern shifts from Pattern A-mp or
from Pattern B-mp to Pattern A-B with decreasing transportation costs.
L. For the shift of location pattern about Pattern A-B
and Pattern A when transportation costs fall
The equilibrium condition for Pattern A-B (72) is expressed as follows:
ξBA (2σ − (µ+ σ)ξAB)− σ + µ ≤ 0
Whereas the equilibrium condition for Pattern A (66) is expressed as follows:
ξBA (2σ − (µ+ σ)ξAB)− σ + µ ≥ 0
Setting φT ≡ φAB = φBA, the first derivative of the left-hand side of both
equations with φT is (−(µ+σ)ξBA ) ∂ξ
A
B
∂φT
+(2σ−(µ+σ)ξAB) ∂ξ
B
A
∂φT
R 0⇔ ξAB Q σσ+µ .
Therefore, the location pattern shifts from Pattern A-B to Pattern A when
ξAB <
σ
σ+µ
, whereas the location pattern shifts from Pattern A to Pattern
A-B when ξAB >
σ
σ+µ
.
M. For the shift of location pattern about Pattern A-B
and Pattern B when transportation costs fall
The equilibrium condition for Pattern B (68) is expressed as follows:
ξAB(2σ − (σ − µ)ξBA )− σ − µ ≥ 0
Whereas the equilibrium condition for Pattern A-B (72) is expressed as fol-
lows:
ξAB(2σ − (σ − µ)ξBA )− σ − µ ≤ 0
Setting φT ≡ φAB = φBA, the first derivative of the left-hand side of both
equations with φT is positive when ξ
A
B <
σ
σ−µ . Therefore, the location pattern
shifts from Pattern A-B to Pattern B with decreasing transportation costs.
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